A visible difference  by Goodale, Melvyn A.
Turning points
A visible difference
Melvyn A. Goodale
Thirty years ago I was a young
postdoc working with Larry
Weiskrantz at the Department of
Experimental Psychology in Oxford.
The laboratory (or cubbyhole) where
I worked was some distance from the
main department and, perhaps
because of this, our little group of
postdocs and graduate students
developed a strong sense of
camaraderie. We spent many of our
lunch hours arguing science, politics
and the human condition — usually
in the nearby Lamb and Flag pub.
New publications in visual
neuroscience, particularly theoretical
papers, provided much of the fodder
for our discussions. One of the papers
that got us worked up was Gerald
Schneider’s on “Two visual systems”,
which appeared in Science in 1969 [1].
The paper was remarkable partly
because Schneider was a young
scientist who had only just finished
his PhD, but mainly because it offered
a clear and apparently straightforward
account of the functional differences
between the two main visual
pathways in the mammalian brain.
Other researchers had already
suggested the ancient visual pathway
that runs from the eye to the midbrain
in mammals has different functions
from the newer visual pathway to the
cerebral cortex, but it was the elegant
simplicity of Schneider’s distinction
between the two that resonated with
many scientists — including the
discussion group at the Lamb and
Flag. According to Schneider, the
older pathway from the eye to the
midbrain enables the animal to
localize a visual stimulus, whereas the
phylogenetically newer pathway to
the cerebral cortex enables the animal
to identify that stimulus. Schneider’s
evidence for this distinction came
largely from his thesis work in which
he showed that hamsters with lesions
of the midbrain (in a structure called
the optic tectum) were unable to
localize visual targets, even though
they could identify them, whereas
hamsters with lesions in the cerebral
cortex (in a region called area V1 or
primary visual cortex) could localize
visual targets but could not identify
them. This distinction between
identification and localization — often
referred to as the distinction between
‘what’ and ‘where’ — was to gain
wide currency over the next 20 years.
I had been taught to be deeply
suspicious of attempts to map
psychological terms onto specific
brain regions
The original ‘two visual systems’
model put forward by Schneider (and
its later reincarnation in monkeys by
Ungerleider and Mishkin [2])
represented a significant departure
from earlier descriptions of visual
function, which had tended to treat
the visual system as a single, albeit
complex, entity. But even though
Schneider took a more modular
approach, the notion of ‘localization’
he proposed was poorly defined and it
seemed to me that there was
something not quite right about his
story. Indeed, on reflection, I now
realize that it was his failure to ground
the term in observable behaviour that
disturbed my Calvinistic soul back in
1969. I had come to Oxford from the
University of Western Ontario, where
I had been taught to be deeply
suspicious of attempts to map
psychological terms like ‘localization’
or ‘attention’ onto specific brain
regions. People like Case Vanderwolf
and Doreen Kimura emphasized,
instead, the importance of studying
the relationship between brain and
observable behaviour — and by
‘behaviour’ they meant the actual
movements made by the animal, not
hypothetical psychological concepts
like localization.
Schneider’s ‘two visual systems’
theory (as well as Ungerleider and
Mishkin’s) lumped together all kinds
of spatially organized behaviour
under the general heading of
‘localization’. Behaviours such as
turning the head and eyes towards a
sudden movement, running away
from a looming shadow, deciding
which of two holes is closer, running
towards the closer hole and avoiding
obstacles on the way, were all seen as
depending on the same localization
mechanisms. (As we know now, only
some of these patterns of behaviour
depend on the optic tectum.) These
distinctions between different kinds
of spatially organized behaviour were
never apparent in Schneider’s
account. The implicit assumption
seemed to be that once a stimulus is
‘localized’ the information can be
used to direct any behavioural
output. In other words, it was
assumed that localization is a process
that is quite independent of the
behaviour it might elicit or control. 
Two years later, I moved to the
University of St Andrews in Scotland.
Still musing about two visual
systems, I began to explore the
question in my own lab. Our
experiments showed that lesions of
the optic tectum in rats affected one
kind of ‘localization’ behaviour —
quickly turning the head to look at an
unexpected flashing light — but left
another kind of localization behaviour
— running towards a lighted door —
intact. In other words, our
experiment showed that localization
is not a unitary process: different
classes of behaviour use different
localization mechanisms, only some
of which rely on the optic tectum [3].
Just before we published our
findings, however, another ‘two visual
systems’ paper appeared in Science [4].
This paper, by David Ingle, was on
frogs — on ‘re-wired’ frogs to be
exact. For me, it was a revelation.
Ingle’s experiments took
advantage of the fact that the
amphibian brain is capable of far more
regeneration following damage than
the mammalian brain. He removed
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the optic tectum on one side of the
brain and found that the axons from
the retina that were severed in the
surgery sprouted new projections
which crossed over to terminate in the
optic tectum on the same side of the
frog’s brain. When he examined the
visually guided behaviour of these
unfortunate creatures, Ingle found
that they showed ‘mirror-image’
feeding — directing their snapping
movements to positions in space that
were mirror-symmetrical to the
location of the prey objects. They also
showed mirror-image predator
avoidance. These results provided
pretty clear evidence that the optic
tectum has a critical role in the visual
control of these patterns of behavior
in the frog — and also converged
nicely with our own findings in rats.
But, remarkably, not all the
visually guided behaviour in the
re-wired frogs was mirror-imaged.
Ingle found that the same frogs
showed quite normal avoidance of
obstacles as they hopped from one
place to another. As it turns out, the
reason they showed normal visual
control of obstacle avoidance is quite
straightforward; the retinal projections
to the pre-tectum, a structure in the
thalamus just in front of the optic
tectum, were still intact and had not
been redirected to the opposite side
of the brain. (Not surprisingly, lesion
studies in frogs and rodents have
since shown that this structure has a
critical role in the visual control of
obstacle avoidance.) Thus, Ingle
argued, there are at least two
independent visual pathways in the
frog: a tectal pathway, which mediates
visually elicited prey-catching and
predator avoidance, and a pre-tectal
pathway which mediates visually
guided locomotion around barriers. 
Ingle’s experiments, like
Schneider’s before him, suggested
that there is modularity in the
organization of the visual pathways of
the vertebrate brain. But the
modularity that Ingle was talking
about is very different from the ‘what’
versus ‘where’ story. In short, Ingle
had demonstrated the existence of
different ‘visuomotor’ modules, not
simply visual modules. In fact, it turns
out that there are five or more
visuomotor modules in the amphibian
brain, each with its own set of retinal
inputs and each controlling different
arrays of motor outputs. There is no
single ‘multi-purpose’ representation
of space residing somewhere in the
animal’s brain; instead, visual input
about spatial location is transformed in
different ways for different purposes.
Ingle’s paper was a watershed in
my own thinking about the
organization of the vertebrate visual
system. It made me realize that it
was possible to talk about modularity
in visually guided behaviour without
appealing to psychological
abstractions like localization and
identification (as Schneider had
done). Most importantly, however,
Ingle’s paper got me thinking about
how one could approach the study of
vision by looking at the different
patterns of behaviour that are
elicited and controlled by visual
stimuli, an approach that has
characterized much of my own
research for the past 25 years.
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The kinesin-related
protein HSET is
essential for micro-
tubule organization in the
spindles of mouse oocytes at
metaphase II of meiosis. It localizes
along the length of the meiotic
spindle during both meiosis I and
meiosis II. The oocyte at top left
was mock injected and shows a
normal metaphase I spindle (DNA
is stained blue, tubulin red and
HSET green). HSET function has
been perturbed in the oocyte at
bottom right by injecting
it with antibodies
specific for HSET.
This results in
dramatic disruption
of the spindle and
dispersal of the
chromosomes. For
details see
Mountain V, et al., J Cell
Biol 1999, 147:351-365.
Images reproduced with
permission from J Cell Biol and
provided by Duane Compton,
Dartmouth Medical School,
Hanover, New Hampshire, USA.
Biology in pictures
Unravelling the spindle
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